Showing posts with label Europe. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Europe. Show all posts

Friday, 12 June 2015

Mamma mia here I go again

Posting has been quite sporadic recently due to other commitments and will continue to be over the summer months due to a project I’ve codenamed “beach”.

This write-up is about a $300m market cap, Greece heavy, London listed luxury real estate developer so if you feel like you can stop reading right here. The company is called Dolphin Capital Investors and for me it’s the second time around with the stock. I was involved back in 2012 and since then have been a spectator.

To give you a brief background Dolphin is a luxury real estate developer focusing on emerging markets (and now Greece fortunately or unfortunately classifies as one). It’s essentially like a junior mining company that goes around prospecting on a piece of land in hope of finding whatever minerals they are after, however in this case the outcome is considerably more sexy. The company’s strategy since inception in 2005 has been to acquire coastal land and develop high-end hotels and resorts with world class partners. This meant that they have acquired a large amount of land in sight in many countries for which realistically speaking they didn’t have the money to develop and the company turned into a hodgepodge of assets. I could spend pages about the history of the business but I think to an extent it is not as relevant as what’s happening at Dolphin currently.

But before we get there just a brief overview of the business. The company owns and develops projects in 6 different countries and breaks their projects into two categories: core and major projects with the first being the more advanced ones. In terms of NAV, around 80% is in Greece and Cyprus with the rest in Croatia, Turkey, Panama and the Bahamas. Below are some slides from a recent corporate presentation.




Source: Company. Note the figures are as of June 2014. For more recent, though less colourful data refer to pages 16-17 of the Q4'14 report

Dolphin published their Q4’14 update just a few days ago. NAV is currently €557m or around £68p on a per share basis (both € and £ will be used here as the company reports in € but listed in London so the share price is in £). The share price is £21.5p and is getting closer to 2012 levels. This translates into a discount of around 70%. And you might think that’s great…but why on earth should I care, it’s been cheap for a very long time. And if you glance at the below 5 year chart you are absolutely correct. Investors have been reluctant to give full credit for Dolphin’s NAV due to questions on the underlying valuation (i.e. how much of a decline in Greece is captured in the figures) and risk of higher than expected cash burn (not unheard of for a property development company). It also didn't help that on top of the ListCo there is a privately held investment manager that charged 2% on the AUM (now you understand the asset hoarding).


Source: FT

This time is (likely, maybe, potentially…hopefully) different. Let me take you back a bit to 2012. In October that year Third Point took a stake in a company via an equity raise, participating in an aggregate €50m round at a price not too different from where we are today. The macro situation in Greece hasn’t been supportive, I think we can agree on that, and I’ve also heard the same stories that you probably heard about the management of the company so we can assume that Third Point must have been getting pretty frustrated with this position. But they are still hanging in there.

I’m going to conveniently skip a few years and fast-forward to February 2015. Dolphin put out a press release where they announced plans to do the following (i) change the board of directors and add directors who either have significant real estate background or represent key shareholders, (ii) review the business plan, with focus on developing the core assets coupled with disposals, (iii) review management/investment manager compensation and (iv) less onerous governance. So far so good.

To follow up on this the company announced the following a few days ago: (i) separation of assets into core and non-core buckets with divestments on the cards, (ii) lowering the investment management fee and (iii) €75m capital raise (inc. conversion of the 2016 converts). Let’s take these in turn.

The core projects are as follows: Greece - Amanzoe, Kilada Hills and the Kea Resort; Playa Grande Club & Reserve (Dominican Republic) and Pearl Island (Panama). The company aims to develop these into resorts but further capital allocation is controlled by the board. Regarding the non-core bucket (which is basically everything else) the company plans to sell these eventually and will continue developing them to an extent to increase value. Considering the company’s 49.8% stake in Aristo (Cypriot residential real estate developer) the plan is also to sell out.

For what it’s worth, the company sees total net cash flows from the development of core projects and asset sales of €320m during 2015-19 (majority in 2018-19). In addition, they estimate €384m residual value post 2020 and €101m NAV of the undeveloped land for a total value of €805m (pre-tax basis). The company also plans to reduce gross debt from €265m in 2015 to €42m by 2019. More details starting from page 50 of the attached. Returns from core projects and proceeds from asset sales will be distributed to shareholders via buyback or dividend.

The management fee, which is currently 2% of total equity (€681m as of June 2015 – annual fee of €13.6m) will we be cut to the lower of (i) €8.5m flat fee or (ii) 1.25% of GAV from 2017 onwards. All in the board sees around €23.5m savings over five years. The performance fee has also been reworked substantially both on the returns from core assets and sale from the non-core bucket. The investment manager has been granted options totalling 6% of shares outstanding with the target share prices ranging from £35-80p for a five-year period (subject to periodical vesting and hitting performance targets). Worth noting that three board members will also spend more time on Dolphin matters so they’ll receive annual fees ranging from £150-200k and options totalling 1.25% of shares outstanding (less strict target share prices ranging from £35-50p). This is quite generous.

And last, the €75m capital raise provides the “sources” for this new strategy. The company issued 219m shares at £21p (c. 7% discount to prior closing price). As part of the capital raise Fortress, the investment manager and another investor also agreed to convert $14m of the outstanding at a lower conversion price (the remaining c. $15m holders will stay put). The overall proceeds will be used for working capital, 2015/16 opex, investment manager fees, interest and repayment of the 2016 converts. On top of the €79m funding needs the company also requires about €27m to fund the core projects, which they plan on sourcing from asset sales, JV project financing or debt (you’ll find the details on page 9 of the following document. Third Point subscribed to the capital raise and maintain their 20% holding (approx. £11m additional investment). Combined with the other investors they’ll hold around 50% of the shares, while the investment manager will own 9.7% of the shares PF for the capital raise. All in, share count increased from 640m to 905m.

Assuming all of the above doesn’t work out the board will put the continuation of the company to a shareholder vote before December 2016. If the outcome of this is a vote of no confidence, the company could be wound up, liquidated, or restructured. Thus there is additional time pressure on the management to deliver.

Coinciding with the release of the strategic review Dolphin released the 2014 results, but honestly it was a bit of a non-event amongst all the changes announced. The company generated €22m in net income (first time ever!) though mostly helped by gains on real estate revaluation. This implies around 12x P/E on a fully diluted basis.

Per the Q4’14 numbers NAV is £68p and the current share price of £21.5p for a discount close to 70%. If you make the adjustments to take into account the recent capital raise the discount closes to around 60%. And while discounts can move, perhaps it is somewhat reassuring that historical project exits took place at a money multiple of around 1.7x to cost.

Despite the positive developments and announcements the share price has gone exactly nowhere in the last few days. Perhaps the capital raise spooked people, though not sure why as the business was in need of funding if they wanted to continue development. Of course there is a small matter of execution as well.

Not even sure where to begin with the risk factors: Greece, largely illiquid land investments, so-so track record, asset hoarding and really I could go on. However, with the changes around the board, governance, strategy, compensation etc there might be something here warranting a closer look. I see this idea essentially as a deep value, long-term option on the recovery of Greece and improvement in the company's strategy and execution.


If you prefer to see what these guys do there is a short documentary on YouTube. It’s worth a watch, some of their stuff is really sexy. Oh yes and in closing, the company posts broker reports on their website. Read those with a pinch of salt.

Sunday, 8 March 2015

Cash at a discount from the Swiss Alps

Spice Private Equity (previously APEN) is a listed private equity fund that makes secondary and co-investments in emerging market funds and is listed on the SIX Swiss exchange, trading at a significant discount to NAV. While there are plenty of examples of closed end funds trading at large discounts I believe there are catalysts that could help close the discount.

APEN started out as AIG Private Equity in the late 1990s to invest in developed market PE funds (North America and Western Europe) and Asia to a small extent. Things were quite rosy, however starting in 2006/07 the company experienced NAV declines and found itself in a tight situation liquidity-wise amidst substantial capital calls, as the expectations of a largely self-funding portfolio did not materialise. The company raised debt and equity (via preferreds) from a group of banks and AIG itself. Then the crisis came, the capital calls didn’t stop, APEN began looking for new sources of liquidity and finally found prince charming in Fortress (which of course didn’t come cheap).

In 2013 the company went through a restructuring with GP Investments and Newbury Partners (Brazilian and US PE funds) taking a controlling stake and buying out AIG, selling assets and refinancing debt. They also issued 1.4m shares at CHF21.8 (virtually equal to today’s share price) and raised about CHF31m. At the same time the company set up a new investment guideline and decided to liquidate what they call as the “legacy portfolio” (mostly developed market funds) and focus solely on EM.

This actually happened a lot faster than expected, as early this year APEN concluded a sale of the legacy assets (as well as the debt on the balance sheet) to Blackstone’s secondaries business for $192m. The net receivable amount will be around $187m or $37m over 5 instalments through 2017 (more details on the transaction here). This transaction represents a 14% discount in USD terms to the fair value as of June 2014. Following the transaction, the company is switching to a reporting currency of USD (instead of CHF, including the share price over the next few months), which is more representative of the underlying investments. In addition, it recently changed its name from APEN to Spice (which sounds more like a late night TV channel, but I get the concept). Following the divestment, the NAV essentially consists of cash and receivables, with a few investments in emerging market related funds and companies.

These steps have created a simpler story around the stock, yet the discount and share price moved exactly nowhere. Potential reasons are that Spice is (i) small: c. $120m market cap with no analyst coverage; (ii) illiquid - close to 60% of the company is held by the controlling group with a few other funds having 3-5% positions and only a few thousand shares trading daily and (iii) history - earlier association with AIG and a hodgepodge of funds probably didn’t help.

Let’s look at some simple math. The Q4’14 guided NAV is CHF37.5 ($37.7) or c. $200m. Following the transaction, this is made up mostly of cash and receivables. Current market cap is $120m, which translates to a discount of 40%. Assuming that the 14% transaction discount is representative (and some discount is fair as you’ve to take taxes into account, mgmt. fees and other opex etc) there is a 40% upside i.e. a share price of $32. I don’t think that this number is crazy as looking at historical trading patterns the stock used to trade at a slight discount to premium to NAV prior to the mess that started in 2008. One additional item to add. As part of the restructuring, Fortress received an option (valid through 2018) for about 700k shares to put back to the company at CHF21.8 and the company has a call option to purchase these shares at CHF41.8. The PV of this is treated as a liability on the balance sheet to the tune of CHF15.6m ($16m) or around $3 per share. This is already calculated in the NAV figures and GP has the first right of refusal on these shares.

There are two ways to reduce the discount: (i) deliver on what you set out and the market should eventually recognise it or (ii) destroy NAV. I do believe that with the new group of shareholders there is change on the horizon. Mgmt stated their intention to close the gap on the NAV and considering that they have a substantial stake they’d have the incentive to do so (though they do benefit in other ways as well). GP Investments, which is associated with the founders of 3G Capital, subject of the Dream Big book, receives fee of CHF5.1m ($5m) for the first five years and a performance fee of 10% on the NAV increase (after a 5% hurdle), which after year five will convert to a flat 1.5% fee. There is a bit of (what I call) fleecing of the minority shareholders, however it is hard to avoid paying fees in money management. Consider, that to earn the same $5m fee after year 5 the NAV would have to be $340m vs the $200m currently. Assuming they can deliver on the transformation I can live with this.


The restructuring of Spice has set it up for a solid path and while it looks like an attractive public investment opportunity, eventually it might make sense for GP to own the whole thing outright and build it out as their PE secondaries platform. In the meantime, if the board is serious about their commitment to shareholders they could take steps and buy back shares, while they are trading at such a large discount, to increase their ownership and eventually take it private (at a fair valuation to minorities) in the near to mid term.

Tuesday, 20 January 2015

Immofinanz and the tale of Russian exposure

Now for something a bit closer to home. I’ve been looking for ways to slowly start taking advantage of the current mess that’s happening in Russia and think the best approach is having a basket of securities. Immofinanz could make an interesting addition to this basket.

The company was started back in 1990 and is now one of the largest European real estate companies, listed in Vienna and Warsaw. The company has an integrated operating model of developing properties, servicing and managing, and trading as and when interesting opportunities arise (they call it the “real estate machine”…the machine).  The current portfolio consists of 470 properties with rentable area of 3.5m sqm. Their core markets are CEE/SEE (c. 70%) while the rest in Austria/Germany. Around 85% of the portfolio is in office/retail with the rest in logistics (under consideration for an eventual exit) and other non-core assets. The portfolio is very well developed, with 86% in rent generating properties and 7% each for properties under construction and pipeline. All of the above is carried at €6.8bn (€5.9bn in revenue generating assets). The average LTV on the various properties is 42%, while it’s 52% at the consolidated level with financing cost of 4%. Mgmt said they are comfortable with this level going forward (indicated 45-55% on a recent call). The below illustrates what Immofinanz owns as of October last year.


Source: Immofinanz

In addition, the company owns a 49% stake in BUWOG – collection of residential real estate assets in Germany and Austria. It was originally acquired from the Austrian government in 2004 and last April it spun-off this business to focus on core assets both geographically (mostly CEE/SEE) and segment wise (commercial). Immofinanz retains a 49% stake in the business and doesn’t consolidate it. This stake is worth around €820m currently and given the nature of the business, offers a solid dividend yield of 4-5%. Actually, part of the reason of the spin-off was to increase the yield on the overall portfolio. Prior to the spin gross running yield was 6.8% that increased to around 7.8% on Immofinanz. The company expects to be out of BUWOG in the mid-term.


Source: Immofinanz

The single largest exposure is Russia, which makes up 25% of portfolio and over 35% of the rental income, which seems to have spooked a lot of people in 2014 (Immofinanz share price down from €3 to €2 currently). The company has 6 assets in Russia, of which 5 are retail in Moscow, generating a 10% gross yield (for now). Unfortunately, the looming recession in the country is dampening consumer spending, which makes it harder for retailers to cover rent. The rent is either in USD or EUR, against which the RUB substantially devalued so as you can see retailers are hit twice. To help them out Immofinanz is offering temporary fixing of the FX on the rents for the next three months. They’ve done the same in the 08/09 crisis. A positive element for retailers (not so much for developers) is the fact that the Russian shopping centre market has one of the largest pipelines of new projects in the region, which could push down rental prices. Granted a chunk of it will be delayed/cancelled, but certainly not helping in this environment. Nevertheless, given the situation vacancy rates will likely be increasing, while rental values have already fallen thus write-offs on the Russian assets are likely forthcoming (assets currently carried at €1.7bn). It is going to be a tough 12-18 months for sure. Excluding Russia the situation is better, with attractive yields in (an artificially) low interest rate environment with more money coming into the region (e.g. Romania and Hungary) leading to increased transaction volumes.

The company has spent considerable efforts to streamline the portfolio, selling €2.7bn worth of properties over a 4 year period (mostly non-core, residential, hotels etc) with average margin of 14% over carried value, and looks to do more going forward, which should help cash flow. Immofinanz also plans €1-1.5bn of property development over the mid-term on the retail side. Currently, there is around €390m costs outstanding on development projects, mostly in Germany and Poland, in addition to €480m already spent (vs €980m fair value).

In the last financial year the company didn’t pay a dividend (in-lieu it spun off BUWOG, which pays a solid dividend). At the beginning of the year the company planned on €0.15-0.2/share dividend and buyback (8.6% yield at midpoint), however the dividend might be cancelled (for various accounting/tax reasons under Austrian law – it basically needs distributable profits), however a buyback programme will likely be maintained. The company plans to repay a financing tied to its treasury shares, cancel these (c. 9% outstanding) and launch another buyback. Personally, at this valuation I'd prefer a buyback vs dividend.

Just a word on mgmt. Back in 2008 the former CEO was ousted (later convicted for breach of trust – urge you to read around the story a bit). The current CEO – Eduard Zehetner – was brought in and did a tremendous job turning the company around, which at one point was near bankruptcy, however he will be stepping down this year.

Now for the juicy stuff (I’m including the treasury shares for the calculations, though these are in the process of being retired). The NAV of the portfolio is €4.5bn of which €3.1bn is in Eastern European/Russian assets (€0.6bn in Austria and €0.8bn for the BUWOG assets), while the market cap is €2.3bn, for a c. 50% discount. Assuming for a second that you fix the holding discount on the W. European assets at 0, BUWOG at market, the implied discount on the Eastern European assets is over 70%! I know things are bad but this is excessive.

So what about upside/downside cases. To be super bearish, if you wanted to completely write-off the E. European/Russian assets (inc. Romania, Hungary etc) you’d get to around €1.3/share but this is a very unlikely situation. Based on my estimates, downside is around €2/share (though if dividend is not paid this year and not replaced with buyback it could dip below). Upside depends on how much you believe the discount on the E. European/Russian assets would shrink. A discount of 40-50% on these implies €2.6-2.8/share, even after taking into account some write-off on the Russian assets. The key catalyst is obviously improvement in geopolitics for which you have to look through the next 12-18 months for sure. In addition, follow-on buybacks supported by asset sales would also help.

If you don’t feel comfortable owning the equity directly you could structure the trade with convertibles e.g. the 2018 maturity, 4.25% interest, put option in 2016 with full dividend protection. You’ll get exposure to both Immofinanz and BUWOG and can pick up a c. 4% yield.